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Abstract—Mobile crowdsourced sensing (MCS) is a new
paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones
to efficiently collect data, enabling numerous novel applications.
To achieve good service quality for a MCS application, incentive
mechanisms are necessary to attract more user participation.
Most of existing mechanisms apply only for the offline scenario
where all users’ information are known a priori. On the contrary,
we focus on a more real scenario where users arrive one by
one online in a random order. We model the problem as an
online auction in which the users submit their private types
to the crowdsourcer over time, and the crowdsourcer aims to
select a subset of users before a specified deadline for maximizing
the total value of the services provided by selected users under
a budget constraint. We design two online mechanisms, OMZ
and OMG, satisfying the computational efficiency, individual
rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty
and constant competitiveness under the zero arrival-departure
interval case and a more general case, respectively. Through
extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate
the theoretical properties of our online mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is a distributed problem-solving model in
which a crowd of undefined size is engaged to solve a complex
problem through an open call [1]. Nowadays, the proliferation
of smartphones provides a new opportunity for extending
existing web-based crowdsourcing applications to a larger con-
tributing crowd, making contribution easier and omnipresent.
Furthermore, today’s smartphones are programmable and
come with a rich set of cheap powerful embedded sensors,
such as GPS, WiFi/3G/4G interfaces, accelerometer, digi-
tal compass, gyroscope, microphone, and camera. The great
potential of the mobile phone sensing offers a variety of
novel, efficient ways to opportunistically collect data, enabling
numerous mobile crowdsourced sensing (MCS) applications,
such as Sensorly [2] for constructing cellular/WiFi network
coverage maps, SignalGuru [3], Nericell [4] and VTrack [5]
for providing traffic information, Ear-Phone [6] and NoiseTube
[7] for making noise maps. For more details on MCS applica-
tions, we refer interested readers to several survey papers [1],
[8], [9].
Adequate user participation is one of the most critical fac-
tors determining whether a MCS application can achieve good
service quality. Most of the current MCS applications [2]–
[7] are based on voluntary participation. While participating
in a MCS campaign, smartphone users consume their own
resources such as battery and computing power, and expose
their locations with potential privacy threats. Thus, incentive
mechanisms are necessary to provide participants with enough
rewards for their participation costs. At present, only a handful
of work [10]–[14] focuses on incentive mechanism design
for MCS applications. All of these work applies only for the
offline scenario in which all of participating users report their
types, including the tasks they can complete and the bids, to
the crowdsourcer (campaign organizer) in advance, and then
the crowdsourcer selects a subset of users after collecting the
information of all users to maximize its utility (e.g., the total
value of all tasks that can be completed by selected users).
In practice, however, users always arrive one by one online
in a random order and user availability changes over time.
Therefore, an online incentive mechanism is necessary to make
irrevocable decisions on whether to accept a user’s task and
bid, based solely on the information of users arriving before
the present moment, without knowing future information.
In this paper we consider a general problem: the crowd-
sourcer aims to select a subset of users before a specified dead-
line, so that the total value of the services provided by selected
users is maximized under the condition that the total payment
to these users does not exceed a budget constraint. Specially,
we investigate the case where the value function of selected
users is monotone submodular. This case can be applied in
many real scenarios. For example, many MCS applications
[2]–[7] aim to select users to collect sensing data so that the
roads in a given region can be covered before a specified
deadline, where the coverage function is typically monotone
submodular. In addition, the cost and arrival/departure time of
each user are private and only known to itself. We consider
users who are game-theoretic and seek to make strategy
(possibly report an untruthful cost or arrival/departure time)
to maximize their individual utility in equilibrium. Therefore,
the problem can be modeled as an online auction, for which
we can design the online mechanism based on the theoretical
foundations of mechanism design and online algorithms.
Our objective is to design online mechanisms satisfying six
desirable properties: computational efficiency, individual ra-
tionality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty
and constant competitiveness. Informally, computational effi-
ciency ensures the mechanism can run in real time, individual
rationality ensures each participating user has a non-negative
utility, budget feasibility ensures the crowdsourcer’s budget
constraint is not violated, truthfulness ensures the participat-
ing users report their true costs (cost-truthfulness) and ar-
rival/departure times (time-truthfulness), consumer sovereignty
ensures each participating user has a chance to win the auction,
and constant competitiveness guarantees that the mechanism
performs close to the optimal solution in the offline scenario
where all the information of all users are known to the
crowdsourcer in advance.
The main idea behind our online mechanism is to adopt a
multiple-stage sampling-accepting process. At every stage the
mechanism allocates tasks to a smartphone user only if its
marginal density is not less than a certain density threshold
that has been computed using previous users’ information,
and the budget allocated for the current stage has not been
exhausted. Meanwhile, the user obtains a payment equaling to
the ratio of its marginal value to the density threshold. The
density threshold is computed in a manner that guarantees
desirable performance properties of the mechanism. We firstly
consider the zero arrival-departure interval case where the
arrival time of each user equals to its departure time (Section
III). In this case, achieving time-truthfulness is trivial. We
present an online mechanism OMZ satisfying all desirable
properties under this special case without considering the time-
truthfulness. Then we revise the OMZ mechanism, and present
another online mechanism OMG satisfying all desirable prop-
erties under the general case (Section IV).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we describe the MCS system model, and formulate
the problem as an online auction. We then present two online
mechanisms, OMZ and OMG, satisfying all desirable prop-
erties under the zero arrival-departure interval case and the
general case in Section III and IV, respectively. Performance
evaluations are presented in Section V. We review the related
work in Section VI, and conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We use Fig. 1 to illustrate a MCS system. The system
consists of a crowdsourcer, which resides in the cloud and
consists of multiple sensing servers, and many smartphone
users, which are connected to the cloud by cellular networks
(e.g., GSM/3G/4G) or Wi-Fi connections. The crowdsourcer
first publicizes a MCS campaign in a Region of Interest (RoI),
aiming to finding some users to complete a set of tasks
Γ = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τm} in the RoI before a specified deadline T .
Assume that a crowd of smartphone users U = {1, 2, . . . , n}
interested in participating in the crowdsourcing campaign
arrive online in a random order, where n is unknown. Each
user i has an arrival time ai ∈ {1, . . . , T }, a departure time
di ∈ {1, . . . , T }, di ≥ ai, and a subset of tasks Γi ⊆ Γ it can
complete within this time interval according to its willness
and ability. Meanwhile, user i also has an associated cost
ci ∈ R+ for performing sensing tasks according to its current
state such as the residual battery energy of the smartphone
and its willness. All information constitutes the type of user
PoI
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a mobile crowdsourced sensing system.
i, θi = (ai, di,Γi, ci). In this paper we consider two models
with respect to the distribution of users:
• The i.i.d. model: The costs and values of users are i.i.d.
sampled from some unknown distributions.
• The secretary model: An adversary gets to decide on the
costs and values of users, but not on the order in which
they are presented to the crowdsourcer.
In fact, the i.i.d. model is a special case of the secretary model,
since the sequence can be determined by first picking a multi-
set of costs or values from the (unknown) distribution, and
then permuting them randomly. Note that these two models
are different from the oblivious adversarial model, where an
adversary chooses a worst-case input stream including the
users’ costs, values and their arrival orders.
We model the interactive process between the crowdsourcer
and users as an online auction. Each user expects a payment
in return for its service. Therefore, it makes a reserve price,
called bid, for selling its sensing data. When a user arrives,
the crowdsourcer must decide whether to buy the service of
this user, and if so, at what price, before it departs. Assume
that the crowdsourcer has a budget constraint B indicating
the maximum value that it is willing to pay. Therefore, the
crowdsourcer always expects to obtain the maximum value
from the selected users’ services under the budget constraint.
In the online auction we consider users that are game-
theoretic and seek to make strategy to maximize their individ-
ual utility in equilibrium. Note that the arrival time, departure
time, and cost of user i are private and only known to itself.
Only the task set Γi must be true since the crowdsourcer
can identify whether the announced tasks are performed. In
other words, user i may misreport all information about its
type except for Γi. The budget and value function of the
crowdsourcer are common knowledge. Although our auctions
do not require a user to declare its departure time until the
moment of its departure, we find it convenient to analyze
our auctions as direct-revelation mechanisms (DRMs). The
strategyspace in an online DRM allows a user to declare
some possibly untruthful type θˆi = (aˆi, dˆi,Γi, bi), subject
to ai ≤ aˆi ≤ dˆi ≤ di. Note that we assume that a user
cannot announce an earlier arrival time or a later departure
time than its true arrival/departure time. In order to obtain the
required service, the crowdsourcer needs to design an online
mechanism M = (f, p) consisting of an allocation function
f and a payment function p. For any strategy sequence
θˆ = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆn), the allocation function f(θˆ) computes an
allocation of tasks for a selected subset of users S ∈ U , and
the payment function p(θˆ) returns a vector (p1(θˆ), . . . , pn(θˆ))
of payments to the users. Note that, the crowdsourcer, when
presented with the strategy θˆi of user i, must decide whether
to buy the service of user i, and if so, at what price before it
departs.
The utility of user i is
ui =
{
pi − ci, if i ∈ S;
0, otherwise.
Let V (S) denote the value function of the crowdsourcer over
the selected subset of users S. The crowdsourcer expects to
obtain the maximum value from the selected users’ services
under the budget constraint, i.e.,
Maximize V (S) subject to
∑
i∈S
pi ≤ B.
In this paper, we focus on the case where V (S) is monotone
submodular. This case can be applied in many real scenarios.
Definition 1 (Monotone Submodular Function). Let Ω be a
finite set. For any X ⊆ Y ⊆ Ω and x ∈ Ω\Y , a function
f : 2Ω 7→ R is called submodular if and only if
f(X ∪ {x})− f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪ {x})− f(Y ),
and it is monotone (increasing) if and only if f(X) ≤ f(Y ),
where 2Ω denotes the power set of Ω, and R denotes the set
of reals.
An Application Example: As illustrated in Fig. 1, we con-
sider the scenario where the crowdsourcer expects to obtain
the sensing data covering all roads in a RoI. For convenience
of calculations, we divide each road in the RoI into mul-
tiple discrete Points of Interest (PoIs), and the objective of
the crowdsourcer is equivalent to obtaining the sensing data
covering all PoIs before T . The set of PoIs is denoted by
Γ = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τm}. Assume that each sensor follows a
geometric disk sensing model with sensing range R, which
means if user i senses at a location Li and obtain a reading,
then any PoI within the disk with the origin at Li and a radius
of R has been covered once. The set of PoIs covered by user
i is denoted by Γi ⊆ Γ, which means the sensing tasks that
user i can complete. Without loss of generality, assume that
each PoI τj has a coverage requirement rj ∈ Z+ indicating
how many times it requires to be sensed at most. The value
of the selected users to the crowdsourcer is:
V (S) =
m∑
j=1
min{rj ,
∑
i∈S
vi,j},
where vi,j equals to 1 if τj ∈ Γi, and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 1. The value function V (S) is monotone submodular.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A.
Our objective is to design an online mechanism satisfying
the following six desirable properties:
• Computational Efficiency: A mechanism is computa-
tionally efficient if both the allocation and payment can
be computed in polynomial time as each user arrives.
• Individual Rationality: Each participating user will have
a non-negative utility: ui ≥ 0.
• Budget Feasibility: We require the mechanism to be
budget feasible: ∑i∈S pi ≤ B.
• Truthfulness: A mechanism is cost- and time-truthful (or
simply called truthful, or incentive compatible or strate-
gyproof ) if reporting the true cost and arrival/departure
time is a dominant strategy for all users. In other words,
no user can improve its utility by submitting a false cost,
or arrival/departure time, no matter what others submit.
• Consumer Sovereignty: The mechanism cannot arbi-
trarily exclude a user; the user will be selected by the
crowdsourcer and obtain a payment if only its bid is
sufficiently low while others are fixed.
• Competitiveness: The goal of the mechanism is to max-
imize the value of the crowdsourcer. To quantify the
performance of the mechanism we compare its solution
with the optimal solution: the solution obtainable in
the offline scenario where the crowdsourcer has full
knowledge about users’ types. A mechanism is O(g(n))-
competitive if the ratio between the online solution and
the optimal solution is O(g(n)). Ideally, we would like
our mechanism to be O(1)-competitive.
The importance of the first three properties is obvious,
because they together guarantee that the mechanism can be
implemented in real time and satisfy the basic requirements
of both the crowdsourcer and users. In addition, the last
three properties are indispensable for guaranteeing that the
mechanism has high performance and robustness. The truth-
fulness aims to eliminate the fear of market manipulation and
the overhead of strategizing over others for the participating
users. The consumer sovereignty aims to guarantee that each
participating user has a chance to win the auction and obtain a
payment, otherwise it will hinder the users’ completion or even
result in task starvation. Besides, if some users are guaranteed
not to win the auction, then being truthful or not will have the
same outcome. For this reason, the property satisfying both the
consumer sovereignty and the truthfulness is also called strong
truthfulness by Hajiaghayi et al. [15]. Later we will show that
satisfying consumer sovereignty is not trivial in the online
scenario, which is in contrast to the offline scenario. Finally,
we expect that our mechanism has a constant competitiveness
under both the i.i.d. model and the secretary model. Note that
no constant-competitive auction is possible under the oblivious
adversarial model [16].
Table I lists frequently used notations.
TABLE I
FREQUENTLY USED NOTATIONS.
Notation Description
U , n, i set of users, number of users, and one user
Γ,m, τj set of tasks, number of tasks, and one task
B,B′ budget constraint and stage-budget
T, T ′, t deadline, end time step of each stage, and each time step
ai, aˆi true arrival time and strategic arrival time of user i
di, dˆi true departure time and strategic departure time of user i
Γi set of user i’s tasks
ci, bi true cost and bid of user i
θi, θˆi true type and strategy of user i
S,S′ set of selected users and sample set
pi, ui payment and utility of user i
V (S) value function of the crowdsourcer over S
Vi(S) marginal value of user i over S
ρ∗ density threshold
δ parameter used for computing the density threshold
ω parameter assumed on users’ value
III. ONLINE MECHANISM UNDER ZERO
ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE INTERVAL CASE
Firstly, we relax one assumption of the problem: considering
a special case where the arrival time of each user equals to
its departure time. In this case, each user is impatient since
the decision must be made immediately once it arrives. Note
that achieving time-truthfulness is trivial in this case. It is
because that any user has no incentive to report a later arrival
time or an earlier departure time than its true arrival/departure
time, since the user cannot perform any sensing task or obtain
a payment after it departs. In this section, we present an
online mechanism satisfying all desirable properties under this
special case (called zero arrival-departure interval case later),
without considering the time-truthfulness. Then, in Section IV
we revise this mechanism and prove the revised one satisfies
all desirable properties including the time-truthfulness under
the general case without zero arrival-departure interval as-
sumption. To facilitate understanding, in this section it is also
assumed that no two users have the same arrival time. Note
that this assumption can also be easily removed according to
the revised mechanism in Section IV.
A. Mechanism Design
An online mechanism needs to overcome several nontrivial
challenges: firstly, the users’ costs are unknown and need to
be reported in a truthful manner; secondly, the total payment
cannot exceed the crowdsourcer’s budget; finally, and most
important, the mechanism needs to cope with the online
arrival of the users. Previous solutions of online auctions and
generalized secretary problems [15], [17]–[20] always achieve
desirable outcomes in online settings via a two-stage sampling-
accepting process or containing such process: the first batch of
applicants is rejected and used as the sample which enables
making an informed decision on whether accepting the rest
of applicants. However, these solutions cannot guarantee the
consumer sovereignty, since the first batch of applicants has
no chance to win the auction no matter how low its cost is. It
can lead to undesirable effects in our problem: automatically
rejecting the first batch of users encourages users to arrive late;
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
B/8 B/4
B/2
B
t=1 t=2 t=4 t=8
T=8
Fig. 2. Illustration of a multiple-stage sampling-accepting process when
T = 8.
in other words, those users arriving early have no incentive to
report their bids to the crowdsourcer, which may delay the
users’ completion or even result in task starvation.
To address the above challenges, we design our on-
line mechanism, OMZ, based on a multiple-stage sampling-
accepting process. The mechanism dynamically increases the
sample size and learns a density threshold used for future deci-
sion, while increasing the stage-budget it uses for allocation at
various stages. The whole process is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Firstly, we divide all of T time steps into (⌊log2 T ⌋+1) stages:
{1, 2, . . . , ⌊log2 T ⌋, ⌊log2 T ⌋+1}. The stage i ends at time step
T ′ = ⌊2i−1T/2⌊log2 T⌋⌋. Correspondingly, the stage-budget
for the i-th stage is allocated as B′ = 2i−1B/2⌊log2 T⌋. Fig. 2
is an illustration when T = 8. When a stage is over, we add all
users who have arrived into the sample set S ′, and compute a
density threshold ρ∗ according to the information of samples
and the allocated stage-budget B′. This density threshold is
computed by calling the GetDensityThreshold algorithm (to
be elaborated later), and used for making decision at the next
stage. Specially, when the last stage i = ⌊log2 T ⌋+ 1 comes,
the density threshold has been computed according to the
information of all users arriving before time step ⌊T/2⌋, and
the allocated stage-budget B/2.
Algorithm 1: Online Mechanism under Zero Arrival-
departure Interval Case (OMZ)
Input: Budget constraint B, deadline T
1 (t, T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) ← (1, T
2⌊log2 T⌋
, B
2⌊log2 T⌋
, ∅, ǫ, ∅);
2 while t ≤ T do
3 if there is a user i arriving at time step t then
4 if bi ≤ Vi(S)/ρ∗ ≤ B′ −
∑
j∈S pj then
5 pi ← Vi(S)/ρ∗; S ← S ∪ {i};
6 else pi ← 0;
7 S ′ ← S ′ ∪ {i};
8 end
9 if t = ⌊T ′⌋ then
10 ρ∗ ← GetDensityThreshold(B′,S ′);
11 T ′ ← 2T ′; B′ ← 2B′;
12 end
13 t← t+ 1;
14 end
Given a set of selected users S, the marginal value of user
i /∈ S is Vi(S) = V (S ∪ {i}) − V (S), and its marginal
density is Vi(S)/bi. When a new user i arrives, the mechanism
allocates tasks to it as long as its marginal density is not less
than the current threshold density ρ∗, and the allocated stage-
budget B′ has not been exhausted. Meanwhile, we give user
i a payment
pi = Vi(S)/ρ
∗,
and add this user to the set of selected users S. To start the
mechanism, we initially set a small density threshold ǫ, which
is used for making decision at the first stage.
Since each stage maintains a common density threshold,
it is natural to adopt a proportional share allocation rule to
compute the density threshold from the sample set S ′ and
the allocated stage-budget B′. As illustrated in Algorithm 2,
the computation process adopts a greedy strategy. Users are
sorted according to their increasing marginal densities. In this
sorting the (i+1)-th user is the user j such that Vj(Si)/bj is
maximized over S ′\Si, where Si = {1, 2, . . . , i} and S0 = ∅.
Considering the submodularity of V , this sorting implies that:
V1(S0)
b1
≥
V2(S1)
b2
≥ · · · ≥
V|S′|(S|S′|−1)
b|S′|
.
Find the largest k such that bk ≤ Vk(Sk−1)BV (Sk) . The set of
selected users is Sk = {1, 2, . . . , k}. Finally, we set the density
threshold to be V (Sk)
δB′
. Here we set δ > 1 to obtain a slight
underestimate of the density threshold for guaranteeing enough
users selected and avoiding the waste of budget. Later we
will fix the value of δ elaborately to enable the mechanism
achieving a constant competitive ratio.
Algorithm 2: GetDensityThreshold
Input: Stage-budget B′, sample set S ′
1 J ← ∅; i← argmaxj∈S′(Vj(J )/bj);
2 while bi ≤ Vi(J )B
′
V (J∪{i}) do
3 J ← J ∪ {i};
4 i← argmaxj∈S′\J (Vj(J )/bj);
5 end
6 ρ← V (J )/B′;
7 return ρ/δ;
In the following, we use an example to illustrate how the
OMZ mechanism works.
Example 1. Consider a crowdsourcer with the budget con-
straint B = 16 and the deadline T = 8. There are five
users arriving online before the deadline with types θi =
(ai, di,Γi, ci), where ai = di, and Γi can be omitted by
assuming that each user has the same marginal value 1. Here
the types (ai, di, ci) of the five users are: θ1 = (1, 1, 2),
θ2 = (2, 2, 4), θ3 = (4, 4, 5), θ4 = (6, 6, 1), and θ5 = (7, 7, 3).
We set ǫ = 1/2 and δ = 1. Then the OMZ mechanism
works as follows.
⋄ t = 1: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) = (1, 2, ∅, 1/2, ∅), V1(S)/b1 =
1/2, thus p1 = 2, S = {1}, S ′ = {1}. Update the density
threshold: ρ∗ = 1/2.
⋄ t = 2: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) = (2, 4, {1}, 1/2, {1}),
V2(S)/b2 = 1/4, thus p2 = 0, S ′ = {1, 2}. Update the
threshold density: ρ∗ = 1/4.
⋄ t = 4: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) = (4, 8, {1, 2}, 1/4, {1}),
V3(S)/b3 = 1/5, thus p3 = 0, S ′ = {1, 2, 3}. Update
the density threshold: ρ∗ = 1/4.
⋄ t = 6: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) = (8, 16, {1, 2, 3}, 1/4, {1}),
V4(S)/b4 = 1, thus p4 = 4, S = {1, 4}, S ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
⋄ t=7: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S)= (8, 16, {1, 2, 3, 4}, 1/4, {1, 4}),
V5(S)/b5 = 1/3, thus p5 = 4. Finally, the set of selected
users is S = {1, 4, 5}, and the payments of these selected
3 users are 2, 4, 4 respectively.
B. Mechanism Analysis
In the following, we will firstly prove that the OMZ
mechanism satisfies the computational efficiency (Lemma 2),
individual rationality (Lemma 3), budget feasibility (Lemma
4), cost-truthfulness (Lemma 5), and the consumer sovereignty
(Lemma 6). Then, we will prove that the OMZ mechanism
can achieve a constant competitive ratio under both the i.i.d.
model (Lemma 7) and the secretary model (Lemma 10) by
elaborately fixing different values of δ.
Lemma 2. The OMZ mechanism is computationally efficient.
Proof: Since the mechanism runs online, we only need
to focus on the computation complexity at each time step
t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. Computing the marginal value of user i takes
O(|Γi|) time, which is at most O(m). Thus, the running time
of computing the allocation and payment of user i (lines 3-
8) is bounded by O(m). Next, we analyze the complexity of
computing the density threshold, namely Algorithm 2. Finding
the user with maximum marginal density takes O(m|S ′|)
time. Since there are m tasks and each selected user should
contribute at least one new task, the number of winners is at
most min{m, |S ′|}. Thus, the running time of Algorithm 2 is
bounded by O(m|S ′|min{m, |S ′|}). Therefore, the computa-
tion complexity at each time step (lines 3-13) is bounded by
O(m|S ′|min{m, |S ′|}). At the last stage, the sample set S ′
has the maximum number of samples, being n/2 with high
probability. Thus, the computation complexity at each time
step is bounded by O(mnmin{m,n}).
Note that the above analysis of running time is very
conservative. In practice, the running time of computing the
marginal value, O(|Γi|), is much less than O(m). In addition,
the running time of the OMZ mechanism will increase linearly
with n especially when n is large.
Lemma 3. The OMZ mechanism is individually rational.
Proof: From the lines 4-6 of Algorithm 1, we can see
that pi ≥ bi if i ∈ S, otherwise pi = 0. Therefore, we have
ui ≥ 0.
Lemma 4. The OMZ mechanism is budget feasible.
Proof: At each stage i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ⌊log2 T ⌋, ⌊log2 T ⌋+
1}, the mechanism uses a stage-budget of B′ = 2
i−1B
2⌊log2 T⌋
.
From the lines 4-5 of Algorithm 1, we can see that it is
guaranteed that the current total payment does not exceed the
stage-budget B′. Specially, the budget constraint of the last
stage is B. Therefore, every stage is budget feasible, and when
the deadline T arrives, the total payment does not exceed B.
Designing a cost-truthful mechanism relies on the rationale
of bid-independence. Let b−i denote the sequence of bids
arriving before the i-th bid bi, i.e., b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1). We
call such a sequence prefixal. Let p′ be a function from prefixal
sequences to prices (non-negative real numbers). We extend
the definition of bid-independence [21] to the online scenario
as follows.
Definition 2 (Bid-independent Online Auction). An online
auction is called bid-independent if the allocation and payment
rules for each player i satisfy:
a) The auction constructs a price schedule p′(b−i);
b) If p′(b−i) ≥ bi, player i wins at price pi = p′(b−i);
c) Otherwise, player i is rejected, and pi = 0.
Proposition 1. ( [16], Proposition 2.1) An online auction is
cost-truthful if and only if it is bid-independent.
Lemma 5. The OMZ mechanism is cost-truthful.
Proof: To see that bid-independent auctions are cost-
truthful, here we consider a user i that arrives at some stage
for which the density threshold was set to ρ∗. If by the time
the user arrives there are no remaining budget, then the user’s
cost declaration will not affect the allocation of the mechanism
and thus cannot improve its utility by submitting a false cost.
Otherwise, assume there are remaining budget by the time the
user arrives. In case ci ≤ Vi(S)/ρ∗, reporting any cost below
Vi(S)/ρ∗ wouldn’t make a difference in the user’s allocation
and payment and its utility would be Vi(S)/ρ∗ − ci ≥ 0.
Declaring a cost above Vi(S)/ρ∗ would make the worker lose
the auction, and its utility would be 0. In case ci > Vi(S)/ρ∗,
declaring any cost above Vi(S)/ρ∗ would leave the user
unallocated with utility 0. If the user declares a cost lower
than Vi(S)/ρ∗ it will be allocated. In such a case, however,
its utility will be negative. Hence the user’s utility is always
maximized by reporting its true cost: bi = ci.
Lemma 6. The OMZ mechanism satisfies the consumer
sovereignty.
Proof: Each stage is an accepting process as well as a
sampling process ready for the next stage. As a result, users
are not automatically rejected during the sampling process,
and are allocated as long as their marginal densities are not
less than the current density threshold, and the allocated stage-
budget has not been exhausted.
Before analyzing the competitiveness of the OMZ mech-
anism, we firstly introduce an offline mechanism proposed
by Singer [22], which is proved to satisfy computational
efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, and truth-
fulness. This mechanism does not have knowledge about users’
costs, but it is an offline mechanism, i.e., all users submit their
bids to the mechanism and wait for the mechanism to collect
all the bids and decide on an allocation. This mechanism has
been proved to be O(1)-competitive in maximizing the value of
services received under budget constraint compared with the
optimal solution. Therefore, we only need to prove that the
OMZ mechanism has a constant competitive ratio compared
with this offline mechanism, then the OMZ mechanism will
also be O(1)-competitive compared with the optimal solution.
Note that in the offline scenario satisfying the time-truthfulness
and the consumer sovereignty is trivial, since all decisions
are made after all users’ information is submitted to the
crowdsourcer.
Algorithm 3: Proportional Share Mechanism (Offline)
[22]
Input: Budget constraint B, User set U
/* Winner selection phase */
1 S ← ∅; i← argmaxj∈U (Vj(S)/bj);
2 while bi ≤ Vi(S)BV (S∪{i}) do
3 S ← S ∪ {i};
4 i← argmaxj∈U\S(Vj(S)/bj);
5 end
/* Payment determination phase */
6 foreach i ∈ U do pi ← 0;
7 foreach i ∈ S do
8 U ′ ← U\{i}; Q ← ∅;
9 repeat
10 ij ← argmaxj∈U ′\Q(Vj(Q)/bj);
11 pi ← max{pi,min{bi(j), ηi(j)}};
12 until bij ≤
Vij (Qj−1)B
V (Q) ;
13 end
14 return (S, p);
The offline mechanism adopts a proportional share al-
location rule. As described in Algorithm 3, it consists of
two phases: the winner selection phase and the payment
determination phase. The winner selection phase has the same
working process as Algorithm 2. In the payment determination
phase, we compute the payment pi for each winner i ∈ S. To
compute the payment for user i, we sort the users in U\{i}
similarly:
Vi1(Q0)
bi1
≥
Vi2 (Q1)
bi2
≥ · · · ≥
Vin−1(Qn−2)
bin−1
,
where Vij (Qj−1) = V (Qj−1 ∪ {ij}) − V (Qj−1) denotes
the marginal value of the j-th user and Qj denotes the first
j users according to this sorting over U\{i} and Q0 = ∅.
The marginal value of user i at position j is Vi(j)(Qj−1) =
V (Qj−1 ∪ {i})− V (Qj−1). Let k′ denote the position of the
last user ij ∈ U\{i}, such that bij ≤ Vij (Qj−1)B/V (Qj). For
brevity we will write bi(j) = Vi(j)(Qj−1)bij/Vij (Qj−1), and
ηi(j) = Vi(j)(Qj−1)B/V (Qj−1 ∪ {i}). In order to guarantee
the truthfulness, each winner should be paid the critical value,
which means that user i would not win the auction if it bids
higher than this value. Thus, the payment for user i should be
the maximum of these k′ + 1 prices:
pi = max
j∈[k′+1]
{min{bi(j), ηi(j)}}.
Let Z be the set of selected users S computed by Algorithm
3, and the value of Z is V (Z). The value density of Z is ρ =
V (Z)/B. Define Z1 and Z2 as the subsets of Z that appears
in the first and second half of the input stream, respectively.
When the stage ⌊log2 T ⌋ is over, we obtain the sample set S ′
consisting of all users arriving before the time ⌊T/2⌋. Thus,
we have Z1 = Z ∩ S ′, and Z2 = Z ∩ {U\S ′}. Let Z ′1 denote
the set of selected users computed by Algorithm 2 based on
the sample set S ′ and the allocated stage-budget B/2, and the
value of Z ′1 is V (Z ′1). The density of Z ′1 is ρ′1 = 2V (Z ′1)/B.
The density threshold of the last stage is ρ∗ = ρ′1/δ. Let Z ′2
denote the set of selected users computed by Algorithm 1 at
the last stage. Assume that the value of each user is at most
V (Z)/ω, where the parameter ω will be fixed later.
1) Competitiveness Analysis under the I.I.D. Model: Since
the costs and values of all users in U are i.i.d., they can be
selected in the set Z with the same probability. Note that the
sample set S ′ is a random subset of U since all users arrive
in a random order. Therefore the number of users from Z
in the sample set S ′ follows a hypergeometric distribution
H(n/2, |Z|, n). Thus, we have E[|Z1|] = E[|Z2|] = |Z|/2.
The value of each user can be seen as an independent
identically distributed random variable, and because of the
submodularity of V (S), it can be derived that: E[V (Z1)] =
E[V (Z2)] ≥ V (Z)/2. The expected total payments to the
users from both Z1 and Z2 are B/2. Since V (Z ′1) is com-
puted with the stage-budget B/2, it can be derived that:
E[V (Z ′1)] ≥ E[V (Z1)] ≥ V (Z)/2, and E[ρ′1] ≥ ρ, where the
first inequality follows from the fact that V (Z ′1) is the optimal
solution computed by Algorithm 2 with stage-budget B/2
according to the proportional share allocation rule. Therefore,
we only need to prove that the ratio of E[V (Z ′2)] to E[V (Z ′1)]
is at least a constant, then the OMZ mechanism will also have a
constant expected competitive ratio compared with the offline
mechanism.
Lemma 7. For sufficiently large ω, the ratio of E[V (Z ′2)]
to E[V (Z ′1)] is at least a constant. Specially, this ratio
approaches 1/4 as ω →∞ and δ → 4.
The proof of Lemma 7 is given in Appendix B.
2) Competitiveness Analysis under the Secretary Model:
Lemma 8. ( [20], Lemma 16) For sufficiently large ω, the
random variable |V (Z1) − V (Z2)| is bounded by V (Z)/2
with a constant probability.
Note that a non-negative submodular function is also a
subadditive function, so we have V (Z1) + V (Z2) ≥ V (Z).
Thus, Lemma 8 can be easily extended to the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. For sufficiently large ω, both V (Z1) and V (Z2)
are at least V (Z)/4 with a constant probability.
Lemma 9. Given a sample set S ′, the total value of selected
users computed by Algorithm 2 with the budget B′/2 is at
least a half of that computed with the budget B′.
The proof of Lemma 9 is given in Appendix C.
Note that the total value of selected users from the sample
set S ′ computed by Algorithm 2 with the budget B is not
less than V (Z1). Thus, considering Corollary 1 and Lemma
9, it can be derived that: V (Z ′1) ≥ V (Z1)/2 ≥ V (Z)/8.
Therefore, it only needs to prove that the ratio of V (Z ′2)
to V (Z ′1) is at least a constant, then the OMZ mechanism
will also have a constant competitive ratio compared with the
offline mechanism.
Lemma 10. For sufficiently large ω, the ratio of V (Z ′2) to
V (Z ′1) is at least a constant. Specially, this ratio approaches
1/12 as ω →∞ and δ → 12.
The proof of Lemma 10 is given in Appendix D.
From the above analysis, we know that the OMZ mecha-
nism has a competitive factor of at least 8 (96) of the offline
proportional share solution under the i.i.d. model (the secre-
tary model). While the competitive ratio may seem large, we
emphasize that our goal is to show that the OMZ mechanism
is indeed O(1)-competitive, and thus its performance guarantee
is independent of the parameters of the problem (e.g. number
of users, their costs, the tasks they can complete, etc.). We will
later show that the mechanism performs well in practice (see
Section V), implying that bounded competitive ratio serves as
a good guide for designing such mechanisms.
Theorem 1. The OMZ mechanism satisfies computational ef-
ficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness,
consumer sovereignty, and constant competitiveness under the
zero arrival-departure interval case.
IV. ONLINE MECHANISM UNDER GENERAL CASE
In this section, we consider the general case where each user
may have a non-zero arrival-departure interval, and there may
be multiple online users in the auction simultaneously. Firstly,
we change the settings of Example 1 to show that the OMZ
mechanism is not time-truthful under the general case.
Example 2. All the settings are the same as Example 1 except
for that user 1 has a non-zero arrival-departure interval, a1 <
d1. Specially, the type of user 1 is θ1 = (1, 5, 2).
In this example, if user 1 report its type truthfully, then it
will obtain the payment 2 according to the OMZ mechanism.
However, if user 1 delays announcing its arrival time and
reports θ′1 = (5, 5, 2), then it will improve its payment to
8 according to the OMZ mechanism (the detailed computing
process is omitted).
In the following, we will present a new online mechanism,
OMG, and prove that it satisfies all six desirable properties
under the general case.
A. Mechanism Design
In order to hold several desirable properties of the OMZ
mechanism, we adopt a similar algorithm framework under
the general case. At the same time, in order to guarantee the
cost- and time-truthfulness, it is necessary to modify the OMZ
mechanism based on the following principles. Firstly, any user
is added to the sample set only when it departs; otherwise,
the bid-independence will be destroyed if its arrival-departure
time spans multiple stages, because a user can indirectly affect
its payment now. Secondly, if there are multiple users who
have not yet departed at some time, we sort these online
users according to their marginal values, instead of their
marginal densities, and preferentially select those users with
higher marginal value. In this way, the bid-independence can
be held. Thirdly, whenever a new time step arrives, it scans
through the list of users who have not yet departed and selects
those whose marginal densities are not less than the current
density threshold under the stage-budget constraint, even if
some arrived much earlier. At the departure time of any user
who was selected as a winner, the user is paid for a price
equal to the maximum price attained during the user’s reported
arrival-departure interval, even if this price is larger than the
price at the time step when the user was selected as a winner.
Algorithm 4: Online Mechanism under General Case
(OMG)
Input: Budget constraint B, deadline T
1 (t, T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S)← (1, T
2⌊log2 T⌋
, B
2⌊log2 T⌋
, ∅, ǫ, ∅);
2 while t ≤ T do
3 Add all new users arriving at time step t to a set of
online users O; O′ ← O \ S;
4 repeat
5 i← argmaxj∈O′(Vj(S));
6 if bi ≤ Vi(S)/ρ∗ ≤ B′ −
∑
j∈S pj then
7 pi ← Vi(S)/ρ∗; S ← S ∪ {i};
8 else pi ← 0;
9 O′ ← O′ \ {i};
10 until O′ = ∅;
11 Remove all users departing at time step t from O,
and add them to S ′;
12 if t = ⌊T ′⌋ then
13 ρ∗ ← GetDensityThreshold(B′,S ′);
14 T ′ ← 2T ′; B′ ← 2B′; O′ ← O;
15 repeat
16 i← argmaxj∈O′(Vj(S \ {j}));
17 if bi ≤ Vi(S \ {i})/ρ∗ ≤ B′ −
∑
j∈S pj + pi
and Vi(S \ {i})/ρ∗ > pi then
18 pi ← Vi(S \ {i})/ρ∗;
19 if i /∈ S then S ← S ∪ {i};
20 end
21 O′ ← O′ \ {i};
22 until O′ = ∅;
23 end
24 t← t+ 1;
25 end
According to the above principles, we design the OMG
mechanism satisfying all desirable properties under the general
case, as described in Algorithm 4. Specially, we consider two
cases as follows.
The first case is when the current time step t is not at
the end of any stage. In this case, the density threshold
remains unchanged. The following operations (the lines 3-11
in Algorithm 4) are performed. Firstly, all new users arriving
at time step t are added to a set of online users O. Then we
make decision on whether to select these online users one by
one in the order of their marginal values; the users with higher
marginal values will be selected first. If an online user i has
been selected as a winner before time step t, we need not to
make decision on it again because it is impossible to obtain
a higher payment than before (to be proved later in Lemma
13). Otherwise, we need to make decision on it again: if its
marginal density is not less than the current density threshold,
and the allocated stage-budget has not been exhausted, it will
be selected as a winner. Meanwhile, we give user i a payment
pi = Vi(S)/ρ∗, and add it to the set of selected users S.
Finally, we remove all users departing at time step t from O,
and add them to the sample set S ′.
The second case is when the current time step is just at
the end of some stage. In this case, the density threshold will
be updated. The mechanism works as the lines 13-22. We
need to make decision on whether to select these online users,
and at what prices, one by one in the order of their marginal
values, no matter whether they have ever been selected as the
winners before time step t. As shown in the lines 17-20, if
user i can obtain a higher payment than before, its payment
will be updated. Meanwhile, if user i has never been selected
as a winner before time step t, it will be added to the set S.
Return to Example 2. If all of the five users report their
types truthfully, then the OMG mechanism works as follows.
⋄ t = 1: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) = (1, 2, ∅, 1/2, ∅), V1(S)/b1 =
1/2, thus p1 = 2, S = {1}. Update the density threshold:
ρ∗ = 1/2, p1 remains unchanged.
⋄ t = 2: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) = (2, 4, ∅, 1/2, {1}),
V2(S)/b2 = 1/4, thus p2 = 0, S ′ = {2}. Update the
threshold density: ρ∗ = 1/4, increase p1 to 4.
⋄ t = 4: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) = (4, 8, {2}, 1/4, {1}),
V3(S)/b3 = 1/5, thus p3 = 0, S ′ = {2, 3}. Update the
threshold density: ρ∗ = 1/8, increase p1 to 8.
⋄ t = 5: user 1 departs, so S ′ = {1, 2, 3}.
⋄ t = 6: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S) = (8, 16, {1, 2, 3}, 1/8, {1}),
V4(S)/b4 = 1, thus p4 = 8, S = {1, 4}, S ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
⋄ t=7: (T ′, B′,S ′, ρ∗,S)= (8, 16, {1, 2, 3, 4}, 1/8, {1, 4}),
V5(S)/b5 = 1/3, thus p5 = 0, S ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Thus, user 1 can obtain the payment 8 according to the
OMG mechanism. Even if user 1 delays announcing its arrival
time and reports θ′1 = (5, 5, 2), it still cannot improve its pay-
ment (the detailed computing process is omitted). Therefore,
the time-truthfulness can be guaranteed in this case.
B. Mechanism Analysis
It is easy to know that the OMG mechanism holds the
individual rationality and the consumer sovereignty as OMZ
(with almost the same proof). Although it is hard to give
a strict competitive ratio, it is easy to know that the OMG
mechanism still satisfies the constant competitiveness, and
only have slight value loss compared with OMZ. In the
following, we prove that the OMG mechanism also satisfies
the computational efficiency, the budget feasibility, and most
importantly, the cost- and time-truthfulness.
Lemma 11. The OMG mechanism is computationally efficient.
Proof: Different from OMZ, the OMG mechanism needs
to compute the allocations and payments of multiple online
users at each time step. Thus, the running time of computing
the allocations and payments at each time step is bounded
by O(m|O|) < O(mn), where |O| is the number of online
users. The complexity of computing the density threshold is
the same as that of OMZ. Thus, the computation complexity
at each time step is the same as that of OMZ, i.e., bounded
by O(mnmin{m,n}).
Lemma 12. The OMG mechanism is budget feasible.
Proof: From the lines 6-7 and 17-18 of Algorithm 4, we
can see that it is guaranteed that the current total payment
does not exceed the stage-budget B′. Note that in the line 17,
pi is the price paid for user i in the previous stage instead
of the current stage, so it cannot lead to the overrun of the
current stage-budget. Therefore, every stage is budget feasible,
and when the deadline T arrives, the total payment does not
exceed B.
Lemma 13. The OMG mechanism is cost- and time-truthful.
The proof of Lemma 13 is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 2. The OMG mechanism satisfies computational ef-
ficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness,
consumer sovereignty, and constant competitiveness under the
general case.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our online mechanisms,
we implemented the OMZ and OMG mechanisms, and com-
pared them against the following three benchmarks. The first
benchmark is the (approximate) optimal offline solution which
has full knowledge about all users’ types. The problem in
this scenario is essentially a budgeted maximum coverage
problem, which is a well-known NP-hard problem. It is known
that a greedy algorithm provides a (1 − 1/e)-approximation
solution [23]. The second benchmark is the proportional
share mechanism in the offline scenario (Algorithm 3). The
third benchmark is the random mechanism, which adopts a
naive strategy, i.e., rewards users based on an uninformed
fixed threshold density. The performance metrics include the
running time, the crowdsourcer’s value, and the user’s utility.
A. Simulation Setup
The application scenario introduced in Section I is consid-
ered in our simulation. Specially, we set the same simulation
scenario as the reference [24], where a WiFi signal sensing
application is considered. As shown in Fig. 3 obtained from the
Google Map, the RoI is located at Manhattan, NY, which spans
4 blocks from west to east with a total length of 1.135km and
Fig. 3. The region of interest.
4 blocks from south to north with a total width of 0.319 km,
and includes the 6th,7th,8th Avenues and the 45th, 46th, 47th
Streets. We divide each road in the RoI into multiple discrete
PoIs with a uniform spacing of 1 meter, so the RoI consists
of 4353 PoIs (m = 4352) in total. Without loss of generality,
let the coverage requirement of each PoI be 1. We set the
deadline (T ) to 1800s, and vary the budget (B) from 100 to
10000 with the increment of 100. Users arrive according to a
Poisson process in time with arrival rate λ. We vary λ from 0.2
to 1 with the increment of 0.2. Whenever a user arrives, it is
placed at a random location on the roads of the RoI. The OMZ
mechanism is implemented under the zero arrival-departure
interval case, and the OMG mechanism is implemented under
the general case where the arrival-departure interval of each
user is uniformly distributed over [0, 300] seconds. The sensing
range (R) of each sensor is set to 7 meters. The cost of each
user is uniformly distributed over [1, 10]. The initial density
threshold (ǫ) of Algorithm 1 and 4 is set to 1. As we proved
in Lemma 7, when δ = 4 the OMZ mechanism is O(1)-
competitive for sufficiently large ω. Meanwhile we note that
ω increases with the number of users who have arrived. Thus,
for Algorithm 1 and 4, we set δ = 1 initially, and change it
to δ = 4 once the size of the sample set exceeds a specified
threshold. Note that this threshold could be an empirical value
for real applications. In our simulation, we set this threshold
to 240, because we observe that each user’s value is at most
1/100 of the total value when the number of users is larger
than 240. For the random mechanism, we obtain the average
performance of 50 such solutions for evaluations, where in
each solution the threshold density was chosen at random from
the range of 1 to 29 ∗.
All the simulations were run on a PC with 1.7 GHz CPU
and 8 GB memory. Each measurement is averaged over 100
instances.
B. Evaluation Results
Running Time: Fig. 4 shows the running time of the OMZ
and OMG mechanisms. Specially, Fig. 4(a) plots the running
time at different stages while λ = 0.6†. Fig. 4(b) plots the
running time at the last stage with different arrival rates. Both
the OMZ and OMG mechanisms have similar performance
while OMG outperforms OMZ slightly. Note that the size of
the sample set (S′) increases linearly with the time t and
∗Each user can cover at most 29 PoIs, and its bid is at least 1, so its
marginal density is at most 29.
†As we proved in Lemma 2, the computation complexity is dominated by
computing the density threshold, so only the running time at the end time of
each stage is plotted.
0 200 400 600 800 10000
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Time (t)
R
un
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
(se
c)
OMZ
OMG
(a) At different stages (λ = 0.6)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Arrival rate
R
un
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
(se
c)
OMZ
OMG
(b) Impact of λ (at the last phase)
Fig. 4. Running Time.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Budget
V
al
ue Approximate optimal (offline)
Proportional share (offline)
OMZ (online)
OMG (online)
Random (online)
(a) Impact of B (λ = 0.6)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Arrival rate
V
al
ue
Approximate optimal (offline)
Proportional share (offline)
OMZ (online)
OMG (online)
Random (online)
(b) Impact of λ (B = 2000)
Fig. 5. Crowdsourcer’s value.
the arrival rate λ, so Fig. 4 implies the relationship between
the running time and the number of users arriving before T .
Thus, from Fig. 4 we can infer that the running time increases
linearly with the number of users (n), which is consistent with
our analysis in Section III-B.
Crowdsourcer’s Value: Fig. 5 compares the crowdsourcer’s
value achieved by the OMZ and OMG mechanisms against
the three benchmarks. From Fig. 5(a) we can observe that the
crowdsourcer obtains higher value when the budget constraint
increases. From Fig. 5(b) we can observe that the crowd-
sourcer obtains higher value when more users participate. The
approximate optimal mechanism and the proportional share
mechanism operate in the offline scenario, where the true types
or strategies of all users are known a priori, and will therefore
always outperform the OMZ and OMG mechanisms. It is
shown that the proportional share mechanism sacrifices some
value of the crowdsourcer to achieve the cost-truthfulness
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compared with the approximate optimal mechanism, and the
OMG mechanism also sacrifices some value to achieve the
time-truthfulness compared with the OMZ mechanism. We
can also observe that both the OMZ and OMG mechanisms
are guaranteed to be within a constant factor of the offline
solutions. Specially, although the OMZ and OMG mechanisms
are only guaranteed to be within a competitive factor of at
least 8 of the proportional share solution in expectation, as
we proved in Lemma 7, the simulation results show that this
ratio is almost as small as 1.6 for OMZ or 2.4 for OMG. As
compared to the approximate optimal solution, this ratio is still
below 2.2 for OMZ or below 3.4 for OMG. In addition, we
can see that the OMZ and OMG mechanisms largely outweigh
the random mechanism.
Truthfulness: We firstly verified the cost-truthfulness of
OMZ by randomly picking two users (ID=130 and ID=591)
and allowing them to bid prices that are different from their
true costs. We illustrate the results in Fig. 6. As we can
see, user 130 achieves its optimal utility if it bids truthfully
(b130 = c130 = 3) in Fig. 6(a) and user 591 achieves its
optimal utility if it bids truthfully (b591 = c591 = 8) in Fig.
6(b). Then we further verified the time-truthfulness of OMG by
randomly picking two users (ID=17 and ID=85) and allowing
them to report their arrival/departure times that are different
from their true arrival/departure times. We illustrate the results
in Fig. 7. As shown in Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b), user 17 achieves
its optimal utility if it reports its true arrival and departure
times (aˆ17 = a17 = 50, dˆ17 = d123 = 50). As shown in
Fig. 7(c), user 85 achieves its optimal utility if it reports its
true arrival time (aˆ85 = a85 = 201). Note that reporting any
departure time (a85 ≤ dˆ85 ≤ d85) does not affect the utility
of user 85.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Mechanism Design for Mobile Crowdsourced Sensing
Reddy et al. [25] developed recruitment frameworks to
enable the crowdsourcer to identify well-suited participants
for data collections. However, they focused only on the
user selection instead of the incentive mechanism design. At
present, there are only a handful of studies [10]–[14] on in-
centive mechanism design for MCS applications in the offline
scenario. Generally, two system models were considered: the
platform/crowdsourcer-centric model where the crowdsourcer
provides a fixed reward to participating users, and the user-
centric model where users can have their reserve prices for the
sensing service. For the crowdsourcer-centric model, incentive
mechanisms were designed by using a Stackelberg game [12],
[13]. The Nash Equilibrium and Stackelberg Equilibrium were
computed as the solution, where the costs of all users or their
probability distribution was assumed to be known. In contrast,
the user-centric model can be applied to the scenario in which
each user has a private cost only known to itself. Danezis
et al. [10] developed a sealed-bid second-price auction to
estimate the users’ value of sensing data with location privacy.
Lee and Hoh [11] designed and evaluated a reverse auction
based dynamic price incentive mechanism, where users can
sell their sensed data to a service provider with users’ claimed
bids. Jaimes et al. [14] proposed a recurrent reverse auction
incentive mechanism with a greedy algorithm that selects a
representative subset of the users according to their location
given a fixed budget. Yang et al. [13] designed an auction-
based incentive mechanism, and proved this mechanism was
computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and
truthful. However, all of these studies failed to account for the
online arrival of users.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few research work
on the online mechanism design for crowdsourcing markets
[26]–[28]. Singer et al. [26] and Singla et al. [27] presented
pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets based on the
bidding model and the posted price model respectively. How-
ever, they focused only on a simple additive utility function
instead of the submodular one. Badanidiyuru et al. [28] con-
sidered pricing mechanisms for maximizing the submodular
utility function under the bidding model. However, they failed
to consider the consumer sovereignty and the time-truthfulness.
B. Online Auctions and Generalized Secretary Problems
Online auction is the essence of many networked markets,
in which information about goods, agents, and outcomes is
revealed one by one online in a random order, and the agents
must make irrevocable decisions without knowing future in-
formation. Our problem can be modeled as an online auction.
Combining optimal stopping theory with game theory provides
us a powerful tool to model the actions of rational agents
applying competing stopping rules in an online auction.
The theory of optimal stopping is concerned with the
problem of choosing a time to take a particular action, in order
to maximize an expected reward or minimize an expected
cost. A classic problem of optimal stopping theory is the
secretary problem: designing an algorithm for hiring one
secretary from a pool of n applicants arriving online, to
maximize the probability of hiring the best secretary. Many
variants of the classic secretary problem have been studied in
the literature and here we review only those most relevant
to this work. An important generalization of the secretary
problem is the multiple-choice secretary problem, in which
the interviewer is allowed to hire up to k ≥ 1 applicants in
order to maximize performance of the secretarial group based
on their overlapping skills (or the joint utility of selected items
in a more general setting). Kleinberg [18] and Babaioff et al.
[19] presented two constant competitive algorithms for a spe-
cial multiple-choice secretary problem in which the objective
function is a linear one, equaling to the sum of the individual
values of the selected applicants. Bateni et al. [20] presented
a constant competitive algorithm for the submodular multiple-
choice secretary problem in which the objective function is
submodular. Another important generalization is the knapsack
secretary problem, in which each applicant also has a cost
and the goal is to maximize performance of the secretarial
group as along as the total cost of selected applicants does not
exceed a given budget. Babaioff et al. [19] and Bateni et al.
[20] respectively presented constant competitive algorithms for
the linear knapsack secretary problem in which the objective
function is linear, and the submodular knapsack secretary
problem in which the objective function is submodular.
Our problem is similar to the submodular knapsack secre-
tary problem in form, but we need to consider two significant
properties, the truthfulness and the consumer sovereignty.
Although some solutions ( [15], [17], [18]) of online auc-
tions provided good ideas of designing truthful mechanisms,
they cannot be directly applied to the problem setting with
submodular value function and budget constraint. Moreover,
none of these solutions considered the consumer sovereignty.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed online incentive mechanisms
used to motivate smartphone users to participate in mobile
crowdsourced sensing, which is a new sensing paradigm
allowing us to efficiently collect data for numerous novel
applications. Compared with existing offline incentive mech-
anisms, we focus on a more real scenario where users arrive
one by one online. We have modeled the problem as an online
auction in which the users submit their private types to the
crowdsourcer over time, and the crowdsourcer aims to select a
subset of users before a specified deadline for maximizing the
total value of the services provided by selected users under
a budget constraint. We focus on the monotone submodular
value function that can be applied in many real scenarios.
We have designed two online mechanisms under different
assumptions: OMZ can be applied to the zero arrival-departure
interval case where the arrival time of each user equals to its
departure time, and OMG can be applied to the general case.
We have proved OMZ satisfies 1) computational efficiency,
meaning that it can run in real time; 2) individual rationality,
meaning that each participating user will have a non-negative
utility; 3) budget feasibility, meaning that the crowdsourcer’s
budget constraint will not be violated; 4) cost-truthfulness,
meaning that no user can improve its utility by reporting an
untruthful cost; 5) consumer sovereignty, meaning that each
participating user will have a chance to win the auction; and
6) constant competitiveness, meaning that it can perform close
to the optimal solution in the offline scenario. We have also
proved OMG satisfies all the above properties as well as time-
truthfulness, meaning that no user can improve its utility by
reporting an untruthful arrival/departure time.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Considering V (S) =
∑m
j=1 min{rj ,
∑
i∈S vi,j}, for any
X ⊆ Y ⊆ U and x ∈ U\Y we have
V (X ∪ {x})− V (X) =
m∑
j=1
min{max{0, rj −
∑
i∈X
vi,j}, vx,j}
≥
m∑
j=1
min{max{0, rj −
∑
i∈Y
vi,j}, vx,j}
= V (Y ∪ {x})− V (Y ).
Moreover, for any X ⊆ U and x ∈ U\X we have V (X ∪
{x})− V (X) ≥ 0. Therefore V (S) is monotone submodular
by Definition 1.
B. Proof of Lemma 7
We consider two cases according to the total payment to
the selected users at the last stage as follows.
Case (a): The total payment to the selected users at the last
stage is at least αB, α ∈ (0, 1/2]. In this case, since each
selected user has marginal density at least ρ∗, so we have that
V (Z ′2) ≥ ρ
∗αB =
αρ′1B
δ
=
2αV (Z ′1)
δ
.
Case (b): The total payment to the selected users at the
last stage is less than αB, α ∈ (0, 1/2]. There might be two
reasons leading to that users from Z2 are not selected in Z ′2.
The first case is when the marginal densities of some users
from Z2 are less than ρ∗, and thus we do not select them.
Even if these users are all in Z2, their expected total payment
is at most B/2. Because of submodularity, the expected total
loss due to these missed users is at most
ρ∗ ·
B
2
=
ρ′1B
2δ
=
V (Z ′1)
δ
.
The other case is when there is not enough budget to pay
for some users whose marginal densities are not less than ρ∗.
It means that the payment for such a user (for example, user
i) is larger than (1/2 − α)B, i.e., Vi(S)/ρ∗ > (1/2 − α)B;
otherwise adding this user to Z ′2 will not lead to that the
total payment for Z ′2 exceeds the stage-budget B/2. Because
E[ρ′1] ≥ ρ, we have that
E[Vi(S)]>E[ρ
∗]·(
1
2
−α)B=
(1 − 2α)E[ρ′1]B
2δ
≥
(1− 2α)ρB
2δ
.
Because the expected total payment to all users in Z2 is at
most B/2, there cannot be more than ( δ1−2α − 1) such users
in Z2. Since the value of each user is at most V (Z)/ω, the
expected total loss due to these missed users is at most ( δ1−2α−
1)V (Z)/ω. Therefore, we have that
E[V (Z ′2)] ≥ E[V (Z2)]− (
δ
1− 2α
− 1)
V (Z)
ω
−
E[V (Z ′1)]
δ
≥
V (Z)
2
− (
δ
1 − 2α
− 1)
V (Z)
ω
−
E[V (Z ′1)]
δ
≥ [
1
2
− (
δ
1− 2α
− 1)
1
ω
−
1
δ
]E[V (Z ′1)].
Considering both of case (a) and (b), the ratio of E[V (Z ′2)]
to E[V (Z ′1)] will be at least 2α/δ, if it satisfies that
1
2
− (
δ
1− 2α
− 1)
1
ω
−
1
δ
=
2α
δ
. (1)
Therefore, for a specific parameter ω, we can obtain the op-
timal ratio of E[V (Z ′2)] to E[V (Z ′1)] by solving the following
optimization problem:
Maximize 2α
δ
subject to Eq. (1) and α ∈ (0, 1/2].
When ω is sufficiently large (at least 12), we can obtain a
constant ratio of E[V (Z ′2)] to E[V (Z ′1)]. Fig. 8 illustrates the
optimal ratios that can be obtained by fixing proper δ when
different values of ω are set. As ω becomes larger, a higher
ratio can be obtained. More importantly, both the optimal ratio
of E[V (Z ′2)] to E[V (Z ′1)] and the optimal value of δ converges
fast as ω increases. Specially, the optimal ratio approaches 1/4
as ω →∞ and δ → 4.
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Fig. 8. The optimal ratio of E[V (Z′
2
)] to E[V (Z′
1
)] by fixing proper δ with
different values of ω.
C. Proof of Lemma 9
Assume that the set of selected users computed with the
budget B′/2 is Sl = {1, 2, . . . , l}, and the set of selected users
computed with the budget B′ is Sk = {1, 2, . . . , k}. Then,
users can be sorted according to their increasing marginal
densities as follows:
V1(S0)
b1
≥
V2(S1)
b2
≥· · ·≥
Vl(Sl−1)
bl
≥
2V (Sl)
B′
≥
Vl+1(Sl)
bl+1
≥· · ·
≥
Vk(Sk−1)
bk
≥
V (Sk)
B′
≥
Vk+1(Sk)
bk+1
≥ · · · ≥
V|S′|(S|S′|−1)
b|S′|
.
Thus, it can be easily derived that: V (Sl) ≥ V (Sk)/2.
D. Proof of Lemma 10
We consider two cases according to the total payment to
the selected users at the last stage as follows.
Case (a): The total payment to the selected users at the last
stage is at least αB, α ∈ (0, 1/2]. In this case, since each
selected user has marginal density at least ρ∗, so we have that
V (Z ′2) ≥ ρ
∗αB =
αρ′1B
δ
=
2αV (Z ′1)
δ
.
Case (b): The total payment to the selected users at the
last stage is less than αB, α ∈ (0, 1/2]. There might be two
reasons leading to that users from Z2 are not selected in Z ′2.
The first case is when the marginal densities of some users
from Z2 are less than ρ∗, and thus we do not select them.
Even if these users are all in Z2, their total payment is at
most B. Because of submodularity, the total loss due to these
missed users is at most
ρ∗ · B =
ρ′1B
δ
=
2V (Z ′1)
δ
.
The other case is when there is not enough budget to pay
for some users whose marginal densities are not less than ρ∗.
It means that the payment for such a user (for example, user
i) is larger than (1/2 − α)B, i.e., Vi(S)/ρ∗ > (1/2 − α)B;
otherwise adding this user to Z ′2 will not lead to that the total
payment for Z ′2 exceeds the stage-budget B/2. Because ρ′1 =
2V (Z ′1)/B ≥ V (Z)/(4B) = ρ/4, we have that
Vi(S) > ρ
∗ · (
1
2
− α)B =
(1− 2α)ρ′1B
2δ
≥
(1 − 2α)ρB
8δ
.
Because the total payment to all users in Z2 is at most B,
there cannot be more than ( 8δ1−2α −1) such users in Z2. Since
the value of each user is at most V (Z)/ω, the total loss due to
these missed users is at most ( 8δ1−2α − 1)V (Z)/ω. Therefore,
we have that
V (Z ′2) ≥ V (Z2)− (
8δ
1− 2α
− 1)
V (Z)
ω
−
2V (Z ′1)
δ
≥
V (Z)
4
− (
8δ
1 − 2α
− 1)
V (Z)
ω
−
2V (Z ′1)
δ
≥ [
1
4
− (
8δ
1− 2α
− 1)
1
ω
−
2
δ
]V (Z ′1).
Considering both of case (a) and (b), the ratio of V (Z ′2) to
V (Z ′1) will be at least 2α/δ, if it satisfies that
1
4
− (
8δ
1− 2α
− 1)
1
ω
−
2
δ
=
2α
δ
. (2)
Therefore, for a specific parameter ω, we can obtain the
optimal ratio of V (Z ′2) to V (Z ′1) by solving the following
optimization problem:
Maximize 2α
δ
subject to Eq. (2) and α ∈ (0, 1/2].
When ω is sufficiently large, we can obtain a constant ratio
of V (Z ′2) to V (Z ′1). Specially, the optimal ratio approaches
1/12 as ω →∞ and δ → 12.
E. Proof of Lemma 13
Consider a user i with true type θi = (ai, di,Γi, ci), and
reported strategy type θˆi = (aˆi, dˆi,Γi, bi). According to the
OMG mechanism, at each time step t ∈ [aˆi, dˆi], there may be
a new decision on whether to accept user i, and at what price.
For convenience, let T ′t , B′t, ρ∗t , and St denote the end time
of the current stage, the residual budget, the current density
threshold, and the set of selected users respectively at time
step t and before making decision on user i. Let θˆ−i denote
the strategy types of all users excluding θˆi. We first prove the
following two propositions.
Proposition (a): at some time step t ∈ [aˆi, dˆi], fix ρ∗t and
B′t, reporting the true cost is a dominant strategy for user i.
It can be easily proved since the decision at time step t is
bid-independent.
Proposition (b): fix bi and θˆ−i, reporting the true ar-
rival/departure time is a dominant strategy for user i. It’s
because that user i is always paid for a price equal to the
maximum price attained during its reported arrival-departure
interval. Assume that user i can obtain the maximum payment
at time step t ∈ [aˆi, dˆi]. Then reporting an earlier arrival time
or a later departure time than t does not affect the payment
of user i. However, if user i reports a later arrival time or
an earlier departure time than t, then it will obtain a lower
payment.
Based on the proposition (b), it is sufficient to prove this
lemma by adding a third proposition:
Proposition (c): fix [ai, di] and θˆ−i, reporting the true cost
is a dominant strategy for user i. According to the proposition
(a), reporting a false cost at time step t cannot improve user
i’s payment at the current time. Thus, it only needs to prove
that reporting a false cost at time step t ∈ [ai, di) still cannot
improve user i’s payment at time step t′(t < t′ ≤ di).
Firstly, we consider the case when user i is selected as
a winner by reporting its true type at time step t = ai. In
this case it satisfies bi ≤ Vi(St)/ρ∗t ≤ B′t, and it can obtain
the payment Vi(St)/ρ∗t . At time t′(t < t′ < T ′t), due to the
submodularity of V (S), we have Vi(St′) ≥ Vi(St). Then user
i will obtain the payment Vi(St′ )/ρ∗t if bi ≤ Vi(St′)/ρ∗t ≤ B′t′ ,
otherwise it will obtain the payment 0. Thus, user i cannot
obtain higher payment at time step t′ than that at t. It means
that a user cannot improve its payment by reporting a false
cost if its arrival-departure interval does not span more than
one stage.
Next we consider user i’s payment at time step t′(T ′t ≤
t′ ≤ di) if its arrival-departure interval spans multiple stages.
According to the proposition (a), user i’s payment at time step
t′ depends on ρ∗t′ and B′t′ . Because ρ∗t′ is independent with bi,
it only needs to consider the effect of bi on B′t′ . If user i reports
a false cost bi which still satisfies bi ≤ Vi(St)/ρ∗t ≤ B′t, then
it is still accepted at price Vi(St)/ρ∗t at time step t, and thus
B′t′ remains unchanged. If user i reports a larger bid bi > ci
and bi > Vi(St)/ρ∗t , then it will not selected at time step t. In
this case, more budget will be allocated for other users, and
B′t′ will be diminished. Therefore, user i cannot obtain higher
payment at time step t′.
Secondly, we consider the case when user i is not selected
as a winner by reporting its true type at time step t = ai. In
this case it satisfies ci > Vi(St)/ρ∗t , or Vi(St)/ρ∗t > B′t. In
case ci > Vi(St)/ρ∗t , if user i reports a false cost bi which still
satisfies bi > Vi(St)/ρ∗t , then the outcome remains unchanged.
If user i reports a lower bid bi < ci and bi ≤ Vi(St)/ρ∗t , then it
will be accepted at price Vi(St)/ρ∗t at time step t. In such case,
however, its utility will be negative. In addition, B′t′ remains
unchanged, and thus user i’s payment at time step t′ > t is not
affected. In case Vi(St)/ρ∗t > B′t, reporting a false cost does
not affect the outcome at time step t or the residual budget B′t′
at time step t′ > t. To sum up, reporting a false cost cannot
improve user i’s payment at time step t′ > t.
